Neuropsychological studies of people with specific brain lesions have led to the theory that different parts of the brain are responsible for recognizing living and non-living objects. Now there is direct evidence from activity measurements that this is the case.
Historically, the main evidence that different neural areas mediate the recognition of different types of object came from neuropsychology, and the occurrence of so-called 'category-specific recognition disorders' after selective brain lesions. There is now considerable evidence for selective impairment in the identification of living things -animals, fruits and vegetables -but not of non-living things (for example, see [3, 4] ), and the contrary impairment has also been reported in several cases [5] [6] [7] . This is typically a problem of visual recognition -knowing, for example, that a carrot is an object for eating -and not just one of naming. Several different types of explanation have been offered for these dissociations.
The most straight-forward theory is that visual recognition systems are differentiated for contrasting semantic classes of object -for living and for non-living things. For example, Keil [8] has argued that the underlying conceptual representations of living and non-living things are fundamentally different, derived from a basic distinction between natural kinds. However, the empirical evidence suggests that a more subtle distinction than strictly living versus non-living is needed, as patients with problems in recognizing living things may also have impairments with inanimate stimuli such as precious stones, and they may not have impairments in identifying parts of the body [9] .
Another possibility is that such effects are artifacts, perhaps reflecting differences in the knowledge patients had of objects before their brain damage occurred. If someone had little knowledge about animals beforehand, it would hardly be surprising if there was selectively poor recognition of these items after the lesion. Arguing against this, however, is the fact that the recognition of even the most common objects, such as cats and dogs, can be disrupted. It is very unlikely that adults who were pre-morbidly of at least average intelligence should have been unable to recognize such stimuli before the lesion happened. As I shall discuss here, recent studies using functional imaging techniques also argue against this theory.
A slightly different proposal, which still maintains that the effects are artifactual, points to uncontrolled differences between the stimuli. Living things may in general be less familiar or more visually complex than non-living things, and so patients may be impaired if their lesion disrupts the recognition of stimuli that are either relatively unfamiliar or visually complex [10, 11] . However, selective impairments for living things can still arise, even when stimuli are matched for familiarity and visual complexity [3, 4, 12] . The advantage for non-living things cannot in all cases be due to co-variation in item familiarity and complexity. Such considerations also fail to account for the opposite pattern of category-specific recognition disorders in which some patients are less impaired for living than for non-living things [5] [6] [7] .
Remaining ideas contrast the importance of the different properties used for recognizing living and non-living things. If perceptual properties such as colour and shape are important for defining living things and functional properties for defining non-living things, it may be that these contrasting properties are assigned different 'weight' in object recognition. Accurate encoding of shape and colour is particularly important for recognizing living things, whereas functional information is important for recognizing non-living things -and although these functional properties must be accessed via perceptual descriptions of objects, the perceptual descriptions need not be so detailed to allow retrieval of the functional properties of non-living things. This proposal enables us to account for why problems in recognizing living things can co-occur with problems in recognizing some inanimate objects, such as precious stones: the inanimate objects affected are those that are defined (and represented) in terms of their perceptual properties [9] . It is also consistent with findings showing that colour information plays a stronger role in the recognition of living than non-living things [13] .
There are at least two reasons why perceptual properties are important for the recognition of living things. One is that the perceptual properties of living things are consistent across different occasions (in contrast, the perceptual properties of non-living things may vary). Hence it may be beneficial for the brain's recognition system to assign weight to these properties as they are predictive of the particular object. A second is that living things tend to belong to categories whose exemplars have similar perceptual structures (animals all tend to have a head, body, legs and so on), so that relatively fine perceptual differentiation is required for recognizing living things relative to non-living things [14] . Categories of living thing with perceptually more dissimilar exemplars (such as body parts) may often be sparedprecisely because objects in these categories require less perceptual differentiation for recognition to occur.
Studies of neuropsychological patients represent imperfect experiments by nature, however, and it is unlikely that naturally occurring lesions respect the functional boundaries between different neural processes. It is not guaranteed that the clustering of living things from nonliving things tells us about how objects are normally recognized. It is of considerable interest, then, that recent studies using functional imaging techniques have begun to provide converging evidence for the role of different properties in the visual recognition of living and nonliving things.
PET studies of object recognition
Both Martin et al. [15] and Perani et al. [16] have recently used PET (positron emission tomography) techniques to study neural differences in the identification of living and non-living things. In such studies, scans of a radioactive tracer such as 15 O are used to measure regional cerebral blood flow changes whilst subjects are undertaking particular cognitive tasks. In the study of Perani et al. [16] , subjects viewed slides containing two objects, and they had to judge whether the objects depicted the same basic stimuli; for example, they had to respond 'yes' if there were two different types of dog, but no if there was a dog and a cat. In one scan, living things were presented, and in another non-living things. In addition, in two other scans subjects had to match visual textures and non-nameable two-dimensional shapes.
The scans in the critical conditions -with living and nonliving objects -had subtracted from them the scans obtained in the texture-and shape-discrimination tasks, to eliminate any activation that reflected the early stages of visual perception. Perani et al. [16] found that, relative to these baselines, living and non-living objects activated different neural areas. Living things activated areas of the occipital and inferior temporal regions of both cerebral hemispheres. In contrast, non-living things activated more anterior areas, particularly in the left hemisphere, including extensive activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Subtraction of the scans for living things from those for non-living things revealed selective activation of the left fusiform and lingual gyri for living things, and selective activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus for non-living things (see Fig. 1 ).
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Figure 1
The regions of the cortex revealed by PET studies [15, 16] The study by Martin et al. [15] used baseline conditions in which subjects viewed pictures of meaningless nonobjects, and contrasted this with conditions in which they were asked to name silently either living things (in one scan) or non-living things (in another scan). As in the study by Perani et al. [16] , the authors found that identifying living things led to the selective activation of more posterior cortical areas than identifying non-living things (centred on the left medial occipital lobe), and that identifying non-living things selectively activated the left premotor region (left lateral inferior frontal cortex; in addition, there was some selective activation of the left middle temporal gyrus).
These PET studies are of interest on several counts. First, they indicate the involvement of different neural areas in the recognition of living and non-living things even when subjects know the objects and can identify them; thus, category differences cannot solely reflect lack of knowledge for certain stimuli. Second, the studies converge with the overall pattern of lesion sites found in patients with impairments in the recognition of either living or nonliving things. Problems in recognizing living things tend to be associated with more posterior lesions involving the occipital-temporal lobe boundaries; problems for nonliving things tend to be associated with more anterior (tempero-frontal) lesions [17] . Third, in functional terms, the PET studies are consistent with the idea that visual-perceptual properties are strongly weighted for the recognition of living things, and functional properties are for the recognition of non-living things.
The medial occipital lobe and the occipital-temporal lobe boundary regions are likely to be involved in processing the perceptual properties of seen objects [18] ; the region involving the inferior frontal gyrus may be linked to motor control [19] . The enhanced and selective activation of these areas during the recognition of living and non-living things indicates that information concerning perceptual properties, and information concerned with motor control and function, are differentially important for the recognition of living and non-living things respectively. In this sense, the PET studies ground the category differences relative to other research indicating the functional role of particular brain areas. The work suggests that the neural networks underlying the recognition of living and nonliving things differ, with the differences reflecting perhaps not the semantic class of the stimulus but rather the particular type of information needed to recognize it uniquely.
There remain important questions for future research to address, however. One concerns why there is enhanced activation in posterior visuo-perceptual areas of the cortex when living things are recognized. It may be that this enhanced activity reflects the retrieval of learned perceptual properties of the objects, which is necessary before recognition can take place. Alternatively it may reflect increased perceptual processing, necessary to differentiate the perceptual properties of the target objects from those of other visually similar living things belonging to the same semantic category. It may even reflect the greater visual complexity or unfamiliarity of these items relative to non-living things, as the PET studies have not as yet carefully controlled for such variables in the manner of more recent neuropsychological studies [3, 4, 12] . (In the study of Perani et al. [16] it is also not clear that the similarity of the stimuli on 'different' trials was equated across the living and non-living things.) It may even be the case that each of these different factors is important, with each factor linked to different neural areas -for example, with complexity affecting more posterior and familiarity more anterior areas in the occipital-temporal lobe pathway [20] . The enhanced activity in the left dorsolateral cortex for non-living things, found by Perani et al. [16] , may even be due to subjects having to imagine how to use the objects, in order to judge that two objects were of the same basic type. Imagery of how the objects are used may play little part in judging whether two animals (for instance) are of the same basic type (such as both dogs).
Some of these remaining issues can be addressed in functional activation studies that map out the different stages of object recognition, for instance separating the stages involved in accessing visual memories from those involved in retrieving functional knowledge. Only then can processing differences between living and non-living things be fully understood. We should also look to converging evidence from neuropsychological studies, where (for instance) problems in visual imagery can be evaluated in patients with poor recognition of non-living things. These converging approaches should help to overcome some of the problems inherent in each research technique.
